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POST-EMPLOYMENT LOBBYING
RESTRICTIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT: A
MINIMALIST APPROACH TO
REGULATING ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT
Abstracr Federal post-employment lobbying restrictions currently apply only to former
executive branch employees. Congress is considering legislation that expands the prohibi-
tions to include the legislative branch. This Comment discusses the proposed legislation in
light of first amendment concerns, and concludes that the legislation is constitutional.
Moreover, the legislation strikes an optimal balance between the interests of the public, the
government, lobbyists, and their clients.*
Public opinion has expressed ambivalence about professional lobby-
ists. On the one hand, lobbying is a vital part of the legislative pro-
cess.1 On the other hand, the public sometimes perceives lobbyists as
sly political insiders attempting to win congressional votes by lining
the wallets and stomachs of Members of Congress.2 Lobbyists with
clout and personal influence are sometimes viewed as the most effec-
tive lobbyists. Former elected officials, particularly former Members
of Congress,3 may be in the best position to influence the passage or
* Prior to this Comment's publication, Congress enacted the Post-Employment Restrictions
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp. 1990)).
The statute is notably different from the bill addressed in this Comment. First, although the bill
and the statute both limit post-employment lobbying by former congressional personnel for one
year, the statute is not restricted solely to prohibiting compensated acts. The statute allows
former personnel to make or provide statements, based on the individual's own special
knowledge, as long as the individual is not compensated for making or providing the statement.
Id. § 2070)(4). The statute does not define "statement" or "compensation," nor does it give
examples of compensated acts as discussed in section ILD. of this Comment. Second, the statute
restricts former personnel from representing foreign entities for one year. Id § 207(f). Third,
the statute broadens the bill's scope to encompass all offices and agencies of the legislative
branch. .ad § 207(e)(5), (e)(7)(G).
1. See generally infra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
2. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., THE WASHINGTON LOBBY 1, 3 (4th ed. 1982)
[hereinafter THE WASHINGTON LOBBY]; K. SCHRIFrGmSSER, THE LOBBYIST 5 (1951). James
Madison recognized a general concern over the influence of lobbyists in the Federalist Papers.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). Madison warned about the dangers of "factions"--
united groups of people organized to accomplish some goal adverse to the interests of others. He
was concerned that special-interest groups might be able to wield undue influence over
government merely by their persistent behavior and extravagant treatment of legislators.
Madison's views were highly contemporary as evidenced by cases where wealthy land owners
intercepted and lavishly dined delegates to the First Constitutional Congress even before the
delegates reached Pennsylvania. K. SCHRIFTGIESSER, THE LOBBYIST 4 (1951).
3. This Comment refers to Members of Congress as "Members." Persons that work on a
Member's staff or a congressional committee staff are "staffers."
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defeat of legislation because Congress is a professional fraternity
where reciprocity is the norm.4
Congressional ethics scandals have tainted the halls of Congress sev-
eral times. Two recent examples include the Koreagate scandal dur-
ing the 1970s' and the ethics uproar in the 101st Congress that
resulted in resignations by the Speaker of the House and the House
Majority Whip.6 Although these scandals created pressure on Con-
gress to regulate its own members, Congress has failed to adopt a com-
prehensive congressional ethics act. A new proposal, however, is now
before Congress. The Post-Employment Restrictions Act (PERA)
seeks to regulate congressional ethics by prohibiting former legislative
branch personnel from lobbying Congress for one year following their
employment with Congress. PERA properly takes a minimalist
approach to regulating ethics in the federal legislature and adequately
balances the competing interests of citizens who employ lobbyists, for-
mer congressional personnel, and the federal government.
I. LOBBYING, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The first amendment protects lobbying because it is a form of peti-
tioning the government. This protection, however, is limited. Con-
gress has in the past placed restrictions on certain forms of lobbying
and is presently considering new restrictions.
A. Lobbying and the Right to Petition
Lobbying plays an invaluable role in modern politics. The Supreme
Court has held that because lobbying is a means of petitioning the
government, any restrictions on lobbying must meet first amendment
constitutionality tests.7
4. See THE WASHINGTON LOBBY, supra note 2, at 96.
5. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY. INC., INSIDE CONGRESS 168 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
INSIDE CONGRESS] (in 1977-1978 congressional committees investigated reports that as many as
115 Members took illegal gifts from South Korean officials seeking to bribe the Members with
illegal lobbying activity).
6. Speaker of the House Jim Wright resigned in 1989 following House investigation into his
personal finances and charges of ethical misconduct. Washington Post, June 2, 1989, at A5.
House Majority Whip Tony Coelho also resigned in 1989 to avoid an ethics inquiry into his
personal finances. See Washington Post, June 15, 1989, at Al.
7. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (analyzing PERA's constitutionality).
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L Modem Lobbying
Lobbying is generally defined as the attempt to influence the passage
or defeat of legislation.8 It may also involve other forms of persuasion
such as drafting model legislation, suggesting to legislative staff that a
legislator sponsor or initiate legislation, writing letters to legislators on
behalf of clients, making phone calls to legislative offices, advising cli-
ents on effective lobbying strategies, and generating grass-roots
involvement at the community level.9 Citizens can locate and hire
professional lobbyists from a number of sources. In addition to bou-
tique lobbying firms that specialize solely in state or federal lobbying
activity,10 many law firms provide lobbying practice groups to comple-
ment their litigation and corporate departments.11
Lobbyists' principal function is communicating their clients' will to
the legislature. 2 They perform this communicative function by serv-
ing as a link between congressional policy makers and citizens, and by
helping groups and individuals voice their concerns to Congress in an
organized and effective manner. 3
2. Constitutional Implications
Although the Supreme Court has held that lobbying is a protected
first amendment activity, the Court has decided very few recent cases
based on the right to petition. The Court has considered, however,
legislation that restricts government employees from engaging in parti-
san political activities. 4 The Court's decision provides insight into
how the Court might view legislation that restricts former government
employees from actively lobbying the government.
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 845 (5th ed. 1979). See generally THE WASHINGTON
LOBBY, supra note 2, at 3-10. Lobbying may also include attempts to influence executive branch
decisions. This type of lobbying is addressed in the current Ethics Act and is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
9. See THE WASHINGTON LOBBY, supra note 2, at 8-10 (providing examples of grass-roots
lobbying).
10. See Harbrecht, John Zorack, A Lobbyist for Mom and Pop, Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1988, at
53.
11. See generally ia; Solomon, Clout Merchants, NAT'L J., March 21, 1987, at 662.
12. "Lobbyists communicate to their clients what is happening or is likely to happen in
government. They communicate to government what is happening or is likely to happen to their
clients. They advocate policies and points of view before both Congress and the executive
agencies. They stimulate others to communicate with government." L. MILBRATH, THE
WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 162-64 (1963).
13. See THE WASHINGTON LOBBY, supra note 2, at 8.
14. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973).
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a. First Amendment Petitioning Rights
The first amendment of the United States Constitution protects the
right to petition.15 Although neither the Constitution nor the
Supreme Court have defined the right to petition, the Supreme Court
has protected some acts as petitioning activity: paying individuals to
distribute petitions for public signature,16 and lobbying the legislature
to pass laws of an anti-competitive nature. 7 Lobbying, therefore, has
been identified as part of the right to petition. 8
Petitioning is a fundamental right, inseparable from other first
amendment rights,19 protected from infringement by the states
through the fourteenth amendment.2" Although fundamental, the
right to petition is not absolute.21 Government may limit first amend-
ment rights to satisfy a compelling governmental interest.2 2 When a
statute attempts to restrict first amendment rights, the courts apply
strict scrutiny review to judge the statute's constitutionality. 3 Under
this test, the statute must be narrowly drawn and further a compelling
governmental interest.2
4
b. The Hatch Act's Limitations on Political Activity
The Supreme Court has held that a statute prohibiting government
employees from engaging in partisan political activities does not vio-
late the employees' first amendment rights. In United States Civil Ser-
vice Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,5 the Court
15. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people... to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
16. See Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988).
17. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 875 (1961).
18. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C.), vacated on
other grounds, McGrath v. National Ass'n of Mfrs., 344 U.S. 804 (1952) (holding
unconstitutional a statute that prohibits convicted violators of lobbying regulations from
attempting to influence legislation for three years).
19. The first amendment protects the rights of speech, press, religion, assembly, and petition.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
21. Id. at 483. One author argues that only the core petitioning acts of preparing, signing,
and transmitting a written petition to the government are absolute. See Smith, "Shall Make No
Law Abridging... ". An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1190-91, 1196 (1986). Petitioning that goes beyond these core acts is subject
to governmental limitation. Id.
22. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-99 (1947) (federal statute infringing
on the fundamental right to engage in partisan politics served a compelling interest).
23. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-461 (1958).
24. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
25. 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973).
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examined the constitutionality of the Hatch Political Activities Act26
(Hatch Act). The Hatch Act is sweeping: it prohibits countless execu-
tive branch employees from taking an active part in partisan politics,
including participating in political campaigns and holding local party
offices.27 Regardless of the Hatch Act's seeming breadth, the Court
held that the Hatch Act is narrowly tailored to meet the government's
interest.28 The government's interest in preventing its employees from
participating in partisan politics and in preventing the coercion of its
public servants is compelling.29 The Court implicitly reasoned that
the Hatch Act is narrowly tailored because it does not restrict all polit-
ical activity.3" Government employees can still vote and express per-
sonal views.31 The Court stated that to avoid erosion of the public's
confidence in government, government employees should avoid biased
political activities.32
Dissenting in Letter Carriers, Justice Douglas argued that the Hatch
Act is not narrowly tailored. First, the Hatch Act is too broad
because it applies to civil service positions that do not threaten the
appearance of integrity.33 Second, the Act unnecessarily restricts gov-
ernment employees' political activities during personal, non-work
hours.34 Justice Douglas feared that overly broad statutes risk deter-
ring the exercise of first amendment freedoms, the foundation of
American society.35
B. Current Lobbying Regulations
Congress and the state legislatures have regulated certain types of
lobbying for some time. In 1978, Congress enacted the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act (Ethics Act),36 which directly restricts lobbying by cer-
tain former executive branch personnel. The states have restricted the
post-employment lobbying of both legislative and executive branch
personnel. Congress now is considering extending the Ethics Act to
ex-congressional personnel.
26. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7324(a) (West 1980).
27. See id
28. Letter Carrier, 413 U.S. at 580.
29. Id at 566-67.
30. Id at 556.
31. Id
32. Id at 565.
33. Id at 597-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 620
(1973) (Douglas, L, dissenting) (janitors, messengers, nurses, and elevator operators are
employees that pose no threat to the appearance of integrity).
34. Id at 598.
35. Id
36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 207 (West Supp. 1989).
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1. The Federal Ethics in Government Act
Federal law restricts the post-employment conduct of only executive
branch employees. 37 The Ethics Act imposes three different degrees of
post-employment restrictions, depending upon an employee's level of
involvement in particular matters while employed with the govern-
ment. First, high-ranking former executive branch employees are
banned for life from representing any person before an agency or
department on a matter in which the employees substantially and
materially participated.3" Second, ex-employees may not lobby, for
two years, on matters that were pending before the agency for which
they worked.39 Finally, the Ethics Act bans for only one year lobby-
ing on all other matters, regardless of whether the employees actually
worked on the issue when employed with the government.40
The Ethics Act's revolving door41 bans were enacted to avoid the
appearance that government employees use public office for personal
or private gain and to prevent instances of actual misconduct. 42 The
government prosecuted several former officials under the Ethics Act,
demonstrating that the government's concern about post-employment
misconduct is justified.43
37. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (FRLA) merely requires disclosure by lobbyists
and does not regulate lobbying conduct. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 262-70 (West 1985). The Supreme
Court has upheld the FRLA as constitutional on first amendment grounds. See, e.g. United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (FRLA does not violate first amendment rights of
speech, press, or petition).
38. 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(a) (West Supp. 1989).
39. Id. § 207(b).
40. Id. § 207(c). Federal courts have upheld the Ethics Act's constitutionality on due process
grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1973). The Supreme
Court, however, has not decided the Ethics Act's constitutionality on first amendment grounds.
41. "Revolving door" is the analogy commonly used to describe the use of public service as a
mere stepping stone for lucrative jobs in the private sector. See Thomas, Peddling Influence,
TIME, March 3, 1986, at 27. See generally Post-Employment Conflicts of Interest Hearings on
H.R. 5097 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1986) (statement of David H. Martin, Director
of the Office of Government Ethics). Similarly, the related idea of "influence peddling" connotes
using the special privileges and favors a Member or staffer acquires as a result of public service to
obtain access to current Members and their staffs after leaving employment with the legislative
branch. See Thomas, Peddling Influence, TIME, March 3, 1986, at 27.
42. S. REP. No. 396, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986); S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4248.
43. See, eg., United States v. Coleman, 805 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1986) (ex-IRS agent
attended meetings between clients and IRS officer to whom some of his cases had been
transferred); United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1973) (former IRS employee
represented clients before his former agency).
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2. Existing Post-Employment Lobbying Bans on Legislative Branch
Personnel
Although no federal post-employment lobbying statute regulates
congressional personnel, other post-employment regulations exist.
Congressional codes of ethics govern the behavior of federal legislative
employees and contain post-employment provisions. Likewise, many
state statutes regulate the post-employment activity of ex-legislative
branch personnel.
a. Congressional Codes of Ethics
In 1977, the House and Senate adopted new ethics codes to govern
the behavior of Members and congressional employees.' The Senate
rules prohibit a former Member who later becomes a registered lobby-
ist under the FRLA45 from lobbying Members or employees of the
Senate for one year after leaving office.' Similarly, Senate staff may
not lobby either the senators for whom they worked or the staff of
their former bosses for one year.4 7 Senate code violations may result
in reprimand, censure, expulsion, or loss of seniority, penalties tradi-
tionally used to discipline violators of any provision in the Senate's
code.48
The House takes a different approach to regulating post-employ-
ment activity. Rather than restricting ex-Members and staff from lob-
bying their former colleagues for a specific period of time, the House
rules merely bar ex-Members from the Hall of the House if their pur-
pose in being there is to lobby.49
b. State Post-Employment Statutes
The state legislatures have led the way in imposing post-employ-
ment bans on legislative branch personnel. State statutes impose post-
employment lobbying bans of varying degree8 on former legislative
44. INSIDE CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 153-63.
45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
46. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc.
No. 33, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. Rule XXXVII(8) (1988).
47. Id. at Rule XXXVII(9).
48. INSIDE CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 160. Although these penalty provisions may deter
any unethical conduct by current legislators, it is questionable how they impact former Members
who lose seniority upon leaving Congress and cannot be expelled from an institution to which
they no longer belong.
49. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATrVE Rule XXXII(2), (3) (1989) (ex-staffers are
not granted floor privileges).
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personnel."0 States that have such statutes generally limit post-
employment lobbying for the first one or two years after employees
leave public service.5 Some states impose longer post-employment
restrictions on former legislators than on former legislative staff. 2
C. Attempts to Extend Post-Employment Lobbying Bans to Congress
Congress has attempted to enact post-employment lobbying bans on
congressional personnel several times. The most recent attempt, The
Post-Employment Restrictions Act,53 is now before Congress.
1. Failed Attempts to Include Congress in Lobbying Bans
Since 1986, two bills introduced in Congress have attempted to
expand the Ethics Act by imposing post-employment restrictions on
legislative branch personnel. A post-employment lobbying bill was
introduced in the 99th Congress.54 Despite the Senate Judiciary Com-
50. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 84-18 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (1986); N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney 1988).
Twenty-four other states have enacted post-employment prohibitions, although not all apply
to the legislative branch: ALA. CODE § 36-25-13 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-504
(1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-709(b) (1987); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 87401-87403 (West
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5804(f) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(13) (West Supp.
1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68B.7 (West 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1121 (West Supp.
1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 18(3) (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-103(b) (1986);
MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 268A, §§ 5, 12, 18 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-
105(2) (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 105.454(5), (6), 105.462(1)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-2-105(3) (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.491 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:13D-17 (West Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-8 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-259
(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02(A) (Page Supp. 1988); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 403(e), (g) (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-5(e)(4) (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 8-13-490 (Law. Co-op. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.18.221 (Supp. 1989); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 19.45(8) (West 1986).
A few state ethics statutes that limit the post-employment conduct of executive branch
employees specifically exclude legislative branch personnel from their coverage. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-502(8), 38-504 (1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-103(b) (1986);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.18.130, 42.18.221 (Supp. 1989).
51. See generally Schmitz, A Survey of State Post-Employment Restrictions, in "THE
REVOLVING DOOR": ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE 30, 58-63 (1980) (available from the
St. Louis University School of Law). States that limit executive branch employees, on the other
hand, impose bans on post-employment conduct ranging from one year to a lifetime. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-709 (1987) (one-year ban); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68B.7 (West 1973)
(two-year ban); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.491 (1987) (lifetime ban on any issue that was before the
agency during the employment period).
52. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney 1988).
53. H.R. 2267, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
54. See S. REP. No. 396, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
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mittee's approval of the legislation," the bill failed to earn Senate
approval and was, therefore, never considered by the House. 6
The 100th Congress finally took decisive action. The Post-Employ-
ment Restrictions Act of 1988 (1988 Bill) 5 7 was the first statute passed
by Congress imposing a post-employment lobbying ban on congres-
sional personnel.5 8 The 1988 Bill would have prohibited former con-
gressional personnel from lobbying Congress for one year after leaving
the legislature. 9 Congress' vision was never realized, however,
because former President Reagan pocket-vetoed 6 the bill.6" Reagan
claimed that the 1988 Bill unreasonably favored the legislative branch
by setting less severe bans on Congress than on executive branch
personnel.62
2. The Post-Employment Restrictions Act of 1989
The 101st Congress again is considering bills that would restrict
post-employment lobbying by former congressional personnel. 63 The
Post-Employment Restrictions Act (PERA) is quite similar to the
1988 Bill and incorporates many of the 1988 Bill's major provisions.
Ex-Members may not lobby current Members and staff for one year
after leaving public service.64 Most high-paid staff likewise may not
lobby their former bosses for one year.65 PERA would exclude public
55. See generally id at 1-29.
56. See 135 CoNG. REc. S179 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
57. H.R. 5043, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H10744 (1988) (reported as the Post-
Employment Restrictions Act of 1988).
58. See Cong. Index (CCH) 35,108 (Oct. 21, 1988).
59. H.R. 5043, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(e), 134 CONG. Rnc. H10744 (1988).
60. A federal pocket veto occurs when the President fails to sign a bill within 10 days of
presentment and Congress adjourns. Presidential assent is necessary when Congress cannot
reconvene to act on the bill. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 7. See BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 1403 (5th
ed. 1979).
61. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Post-Employment Restrictions Act of 1988, 24
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1561 (Nov. 23, 1988).
62. Id. at 1562.
63. The bills before each body are presently designated as H.R. 2267, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1989) (The Post-Employment Restrictions Act of 1989) [hereinafter PERA], and S. 1, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1989). This Comment refers to both the House and Senate bills as "the
proposed legislation" and PERA. Citation is to H.R. 2267 alone.
64. H.R. 2267, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(e)(1), (2) (1989).
65. H.R. 2267, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(e)(2)-(e)(5) (1989). The proposed restriction
would not apply to employees whose rate of pay does not equal or exceed GS-17 under the
General Schedule for executive branch employees. GS-17 is currently $76,990. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 5332(b) (1990).
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speeches and public appearances from its coverage. 66 Only compen-
sated lobbying may be the basis of an offense.67
Advocates of PERA have articulated several supporting rationales.
Chief among these rationales is the desire to bolster the public's confi-
dence in Congress 68 by shutting the revolving door between public ser-
vice and the private sector.69 Advocates believe the revolving door
creates an appearance of impropriety.7" Moreover, PERA would help
prevent actual impropriety.7
Some Members have pointed out potential problems with the legis-
lation. For example, PERA might impair the government's ability to
recruit new employees and retain current ones.72 Limiting contact
between former and present legislative branch personnel also may
deprive Congress of valuable sources of information.73 Finally, Mem-
bers argue that there is no evidence of corruption in the legislative
branch that justifies expanding present law.74
II. THE CASE FOR A ONE-YEAR BAN ON POST-
EMPLOYMENT LOBBYING BY FORMER
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL
Although PERA would affect many important interests, the one-
year post-employment ban is short enough to minimize most adverse
effects. PERA is constitutional because it promotes compelling gov-
ernmental interests and it is narrowly tailored. Moreover, PERA
strikes an optimal balance between competing interests, a balance that
is well supported in public policy.
66. H.R. 2267, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(h)(4) (1989).
67. Id. § 2(f). The bill imposes both civil and criminal penalties for violations. Id. §§ 2(g),
(m).
68. 135 CONG. REC. S179 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
69. See 132 CONG. REC. E1674 (daily ed. May 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Donnelly in
support of shutting the revolving door).
70. See id.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 16 (1988).
72. Id. at 48 (1988) (additional views of Rep. Edwards).
73. Id. at 46, 48 (additional views of Rep. Rodino and Rep. Edwards).
74. Id. at 49 (additional views of Rep. Edwards). Discussing ethical violations of post-
employment lobbying standards presents a semantics problem. There is no evidence of actual
post-employment lobbying misconduct in Congress because no statutory standard exists to judge
the conduct of former personnel. Although it may look bad for an ex-Member to turn lobbyist
one day after leaving Congress, is it inherently unethical?
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A. Competing Interests Affected by a One-Year Restriction on Post-
Employment Lobbying
Post-employment lobbying bans on the legislative branch of govern-
ment affect several interests. The federal government and Congress
must maintain an appearance of propriety to ensure that the public
has faith in government. Although lobbying bans may address suc-
cessfully any appearance of impropriety, they also risk infringing
important petition rights of former legislative branch personnel and
risk adversely affecting their ability to earn a living. Citizens who
employ lobbyists have an interest in being able to hire former legisla-
tive branch employees. To these citizens, restrictions on choosing a
lobbyist limit a means by which they may exercise their personal peti-
tion rights.
L The Interests of the Federal Government and the General Public
The federal government is interested in ensuring that the general
public has faith in its elected officials. Likewise, the public is inter-
ested in ensuring that its government officials and elected representa-
tives behave ethically. PERA addresses these concerns by imposing
cooling-off periods on ex-congressional personnel, thereby limiting
their immediate access to Congress.
Some legislators, however, have argued that no post-employment
lobbying legislation is necessary because Congress can control such
activity with existing regulations.75 The congressional rules, however,
are ineffective. The Senate rules, for example, are unenforceable
against non-Members,76 and Congress is reluctant to police itself ade-
quately,77 thus compounding the appearance of impropriety PERA
seeks to remedy.
Members and staff may be tempted to commit two types of ethical
violations: selling privileged or otherwise non-public information to a
private party for personal gain, and misusing power acquired as a
75. See, eg., S. REP. No. 396, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986) (view of Rep. Mathias).
76. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate's internal rules).
77. See supra notes 5-6 (discussing major ethical cases in Congress). Although Congress
initiated many investigations during Koreagate and Speaker Jim Wright's ethics scandal,
Congress fell short of actually punishing its current or former Members. Instead, it called off the
investigations once the alleged offender resigned or made a public apology. See generally INSIDE
CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 167 (no action taken by Congress against Members who admitted
they engaged in illegal or unethical activity); Cohen, Ethics Codes and Political Timing, NAT'L J.,
Feb. 24, 1990, at 469 (neither House Speaker Jim Wright nor House Majority Whip Tony Coelho
were questioned in public session about ethics charges; because Coelho resigned before the House
Ethics Committee began a formal inquiry into his conduct, he was never investigated by the
House).
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result of public service to establish lucrative employment in the private
sector.78 For example, former congressional personnel who had access
to secret NASA files in the course of their tenure with the Armed
Services Committee could potentially share such secrets with foreign
entities in exchange for the entities' promises to retain the former con-
gressional personnel as lobbyists. In that case, a clear conflict of inter-
est arises between the former employees' ethical duty to protect
national secrets and personal ambitions to advance their career oppor-
tunities. Although such conflicts are contrary to the public interest,
there are few examples of such activity occurring in the legislative
branch.
Although few would disagree that selling sensitive information con-
stitutes actual misconduct, identifying the misuse of power is more
difficult. For example, do former Members necessarily misuse power
when they lobby former colleagues, even if they obtain no special
favors for their clients? Congress has avoided the problem of identify-
ing actual misuse of power by instead focusing on the "appearance of
impropriety." The problem of "appearance" occurs whenever lobby-
ists' prior employment gives them power that they could abuse in a
particular situation, regardless of whether the lobbyists actually abuse
their power. Because the mere potential for abuse could undermine
public confidence, PERA would limit all lobbying between former
congressional personnel and current Members and staff for one year.
2. Interests of Former Congressional Personnel
Post-employment lobbying restrictions potentially affect two pri-
mary interests of former congressional personnel. Restrictions may
affect their interest in pursuing careers as lobbyists. Restrictions also
may affect adversely their individual rights to petition the government.
PERA's lobbying bans would prevent ex-congressional personnel
who become professional lobbyists from practicing their vocation for
one year.79 The bans would not, however, prohibit all lobbying:
PERA bans only compensated lobbying directed toward Congress.8°
Former congressional personnel are free to lobby the executive branch
78. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S179 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statements of Sen. Thurmond
and Sen. Biden).
79. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (describing PERA's one-year ban).
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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without waiting a year, and are able to lobby Congress for compensa-
tion after one year."'
Post-employment lobbying restrictions may infringe personal peti-
tion rights when lobbyists' interests coincide with clients' interests.
For example, former Members who personally are interested in liber-
alizing American banking laws cannot lobby Congress on this issue if
they are paid to lobby by a bank with identical interests. By limiting
the compensated lobbying activity of former congressional personnel,
PERA would restrict their ability to lobby Congress on issues of per-
sonal concern.
3. Interests of Citizens Who Employ Lobbyists
Some individuals exercise their personal petition fights by employ-
ing lobbyists. Because professional lobbyists are often better able to
influence the passage or defeat of a piece of legislation than most non-
lobbyists,82 hiring a professional lobbyist is the most effective means
some people have of communicating with their elected representatives.
Former legislative branch employees have high levels of expertise
regarding the legislative process and with specific subject matters that
congressional committees address."'
In addition to their well-recognized communicative function," lob-
byists also serve an educative function. If former legislative branch
employees share their expertise with people who use lobbyists, groups
and individuals may be able to communicate more effectively with
their elected representatives. In this capacity, former Members and'
staff teach citizens how to lobby better for themselves.
The post-employment bans on lobbying would impair only mini-
mally the interests of citizens who employ lobbyists. Although the
communicative function would be impaired, the limitation would be
neither permanent nor absolute. Former legislative branch employees
acting as paid lobbyists are not the only individuals who can commu-
nicate the public will to Congress. Citizens can use a variety of other
professional lobbyists or volunteer services.
81. The restrictions could be more severe. Congress could have placed lifetime bans on
congressional lobbying in PERA. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(a) (West Supp. 1989) (lifetime ban on
lobbying by some former executive branch personnel).
82. Professional lobbyists can devote their time and resources to following a bill through the
legislative process, whereas most citizens do not have access to such resources or support staff
and are not always close to Capitol Hill.
83. E. BE wD & S. HoRN, CONGRESSIONAL ETHics: THE VIEW FROM THE HoUSE 41
(1975).
84. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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The post-employment lobbying bans would not at all impair the
educative function a lobbyist may perform for clients. Beginning with
their first day as private sector employees, former congressional per-
sonnel would be free, under the proposed legislation, to teach clients
how to lobby effectively.
B. Striking a Constitutional Balance
When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch
Act in Letter Carriers,85 it weighed the same interests affected by
PERA.86 As such, the holding in Letter Carriers provides insight into
the constitutionality of PERA's post-employment lobbying restric-
tions. To pass constitutional muster, PERA must support a compel-
ling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to meet the
interest.87
The broad governmental interests that PERA and the Hatch Act
promote are identical: avoiding both the appearance of impropriety
and actual impropriety."8 In Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court held
that these interests were compelling with respect to current govern-
mental employees. PERA raises the issue, however, of whether these
interests are compelling when the government restricts former, rather
than current, employees. Two considerations lead to the conclusion
that PERA's interests are compelling. First, the language of Letter
Carriers did not limit the Court's rationales to restricting only present
employees from engaging in constitutionally protected activity. More-
over, the Court has upheld other lobbying restrictions that affect only
non-government employees.89
The more important issue is whether PERA is narrowly tailored.
The majority in Letter Carriers held that the Hatch Act, which affects
thousands of government employees during work and non-work
hours, is not unconstitutionally broad. The Hatch Act places strict,
direct prohibitions on a large number of political activities,90 whereas
PERA infringes only indirectly the petitioning rights of lobbyists and
citizens. 91 Furthermore, PERA's ban is neither absolute nor perma-
85. 413 U.S. 548 (1973). See also supra notes 25-35 (describing Letter Carriers in greater
detail).
86. See, e.g., Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565.
87. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text (discussing first amendment jurisprudence).
88. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565; supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
89. See supra note 37 (the FRLA is constitutional).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32 (discussing the Hatch Act's scope).
91. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (only compensated lobbying is prohibited).
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nent,92 whereas the Hatch Act absolutely prohibits certain political
activity over the duration of an employee's tenure with the govern-
ment.93 Although PERA would infringe lobbyists' right to practice a
certain profession, the Court has never held that such a right is consti-
tutionally protected. Moreover, although PERA would apply to all
former Members, PERA's post-employment lobbying restriction
would affect only a small portion of staff in the Congress.94 On bal-
ance, the Hatch Act's infringement of first amendment rights is more
severe than is PERA's. Because the Court has held that the Hatch
Act is not unconstitutionally broad, the Court probably would hold
that PERA is similarly constitutional. 95
C. PERA Strikes a Proper Public Policy Balance
In addition to satisfying the Supreme Court's constitutional test,
PERA would strike a proper public policy balance. By imposing mini-
mal cooling-off periods on former employees, PERA would prevent
former congressional personnel from using the most sensitive, non-
public information for personal gain. At the same time, PERA recog-
nizes that checks inhereint to the legislative branch reduce the need for
more restrictive legislation.
1. A One-Year Lobbying Ban is the Minimum Restriction Congress
Should Impose
Members of Congress have recommended post-employment lobby-
ing prohibitions ranging from twelve months96 to four years.97 A one-
year ban is justified because one year is the minimum time Congress
can limit post-employment lobbying and still achieve its primary goal
of reducing the appearance of impropriety.
A one-year restriction prevents former congressional personnel
from using to their advantage the most dangerous information-fresh
information. This information is dangerous because it enables new
lobbyists potentially to wield a great amount of influence in Congress.
Congressional personnel who leave Congress during mid-session and
92. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing activity exempt from PERA's
scope).
93. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7324 (West 1980).
94. The Ethics Act implicates only employees who earned at least $76,990 per year when
employed with the government. See supra note 65.
95. Even Justice Douglas probably would have found PERA sufficiently narrow because it
affects employees who directly affect the government's interests. See supra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text (Douglas' dissent in Letter Carriers).
96. See, eg., H.R. 2267, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(e)(1) (1989).
97. See, eg., 134 CONG. REc. H10089 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Wolpe).
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become lobbyists within the same session know who is vulnerable to
pressure or wavering on specific issues. They know the intricacies of
bargaining sessions between Members. 98 The entire process of draft-
ing, introducing, amending, and adopting a piece of legislation creates
incalculable amounts of information, all of which would be valuable to
partisan lobbying interests. When congressional personnel move into
the private sector in mid-session with such fresh information, they
possess tools that are neither available to other lobbyists nor to the
general public.
A one-year lobbying restriction protects against such dangers. One
year, while not a complete cycle for Congress, is an adequate cooling-
off period for former legislative branch personnel. A one-year ban
stops ex-congressional employees from working as lobbyists during
any session in which they worked in Congress. While a congressional
session lasts one calendar year, a congressional term lasts two years
and consists of two successive sessions. Although Congress may con-
sider a particular bill over the entire two-year term, it generally
attempts to dispose of legislation in the same year in which it is
reported out of committee.99 Shorter prohibitions would permit for-
mer congressional employees who have become new lobbyists to inter-
ject themselves into congressional debates on matters with which they
directly participated. This activity creates a strong appearance of
impropriety.1" A shorter ban would also weaken the public's confi-
dence in Congress by spawning cynicism over the cosmetic approach
of such legislation.
2. Is a One- Year Ban Long Enough?
Just as Congress should resist attempts to shorten PERA's one-year
ban, Congress should also resist the temptation to lengthen it. A one-
year lobbying ban is long enough to deal adequately with the appear-
ance of impropriety. Institutional differences between the executive
and legislative branches provide additional controls against actual mis-
conduct. Congress should reject prohibitions longer than one year
98. For example, congressional personnel who immediately become lobbyists may know who
traded which provision in a bill for another.
99. This is not always true. There have been many cases---especially involving highly
controversial legislation-in which Congress wrangled over essentially the same legislation for
years. In fact, the post-employment lobbying restriction is a contemporary illustration.
100. The New York ethics statute seems to follow this logic. New York's law, which restricts
ex-staff from lobbying during the remainder of the term in which they worked, prohibits staff
from interjecting themselves into debate in which they participated as legislative employees. See
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney 1988); see also supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text (discussing state post-employment statutes).
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because they too greatly infringe upon important countervailing
interests.
The appearance of impropriety is the major concern that Congress
is attempting to address by restricting post-employment lobbying.
Because a mere appearance of impropriety is the primary issue, the
statute need only go far enough to address the public's perception of
impropriety. The one-year lobbying ban adequately addresses the
appearance problem because it puts Congress and the executive
branch in approximate parity: both branches face a statutory restric-
tion. As long as Congress applies a double standard by statutorily
limiting the post-employment activity of executive branch personnel
without similarly restricting its own personnel, the public inevitably
will perceive Congress as unfair and perhaps even unethical.
The structure of the legislative branch prevents much actual mis-
conduct from occurring. Two major differences between the executive
branch and the legislative branch support placing less restrictive
prohibitions on the legislative branch. First, Congress' bicameral pro-
cess protects against any one entity exerting undue influence in the
legislative process. Second, special personnel and recruiting consider-
ations in the legislature require less restrictive post-employment bans.
In the legislative branch, the bicameral system'0 1 dilutes the influ-
ence former Members or staff might wield. No analogous limitation
exists in the executive branch. Compared to the executive agency rule-
making process, the legislative process is extremely cumbersome
because legislation must pass through many bodies before it becomes
law. 102 In addition, the public and media tend to give the legislative
process greater scrutiny.10 3 Executive branch employees, on the other
hand, sometimes exercise quasi-legislative rule-making power, but are
not subject to bicameral controls."°4 Often, important decisions affect-
ing many entities lie in the hands of a single, executive branch
employee.'0 5 Thus, Congress may justifiably place greater restrictions
on executive branch personnel.
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
102. Before becoming law, a bill must pass each House of Congress, gain the approval of a
joint House and Senate conference committee, pass each House again as amended by the
conference committee, and then obtain the President's signature. See generally U.S. CONST. art.
I.
103. See generally R. BAKER, HOUSE AND SENATE 149-51 (1989).
104. See eg., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935) (members
of the Federal Trade Commission are officers of the executive branch, yet they exercise quasi-
legislative power).
105. See, e.g., Forti v. New York, 147 A.D.2d 269, 542 N.Y.S.2d 992, 996 (1989). Executive
branch personnel award specific contracts and litigate lawsuits for the government, whereas
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The legislative and executive branches face different recruiting
problems. Congressional personnel, unlike their executive branch
counterparts, lack civil service job protections and can lose their posi-
tions through the retirement, death, or defeat of a single person-the
Member for whom they work. 10 6 Imposing severe post-employment
lobbying bans on congressional personnel may deter people from com-
ing to work for Congress °7 because they will fear that they will have
less ability to capitalize on their legislative work experience later in
private sector jobs. Congress may likewise lose current employees
who would rather leave Congress now than face a greater than one-
year lobbying ban when PERA is finally enacted.1 °8 These recruiting
concerns evidence a need to impose less prohibitive post-employment
lobbying bans on ex-congressional personnel.
D. Recommendations for Improving PERA and the Internal Rules
of Congress
Congress should enact PERA. But Congress should first make a
few important changes to the bill. Initially, Congress should amend
PERA to prohibit current Members and staff from engaging in lobby-
ing activities with ex-congressional personnel.10 9 If current congres-
sional personnel faced penalties for engaging in improper contact with
former Members and staff, they would be encouraged to screen lobby-
ists closely. This change would enable PERA to better achieve its
twin goals of removing the appearance of misconduct and actual
misconduct.
Congress also should define more clearly the term "compensation."
The present definition of compensation in PERA creates two
problems. First, PERA fails to address the issue of delayed compensa-
tion. Delayed compensation occurs when lobbyists are compensated
for their lobbying services after the one-year ban elapses. Congress
can avoid some of the ambiguity created by the vague definition of
congressional personnel primarily generate broad policies that affect many entities. Therefore,
there is less opportunity for post-employment conflicts of interest among ex-congressional
personnel because they do not work with individual parties or contracts. See H.R. REP. No.
1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 47 (1988).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1988) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
107. For a similar view, see H.R. REP. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 48 (1988).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1988). A massive exodus from the
public sector preceded the Ethics Act's enactment in 1978 because of the perception that the
Ethics Act would prevent government employees from earning a living after leaving public
service. The bill was later amended to be less restrictive. See generally H.R. REP. No. 115, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 328, 330.
109. New Mexico adopts this approach by restricting incumbent employees from engaging in
contact with former personnel for one year. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-8 (1987).
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"compensation" by defining through example what a compensated act
is.'10 Second, PERA fails to address instances when the interests of
ex-congressional personnel and their lobbying clients coincide."'
Congress could resolve this dilemma by requiring ex-Members and
staff to temporarily disaffiliate themselves from their employer,
thereby removing the compensation element while preserving the lob-
byists' right to lobby on personal issues." 12
Although PERA's minimalist approach adequately addresses the
appearance of impropriety in post-employment lobbying, more could
be done. Congress should amend the internal rules of both Houses to
better address post-employment concerns. The House and Senate
rules should place uniform lobbying restrictions on ex-congressional
personnel, thereby removing the unequal bans each House currently
places on former personnel. Congress also should require all regis-
tered lobbyists to identify themselves as professional lobbyists before
engaging in conversations with Members or staff. Thus, current con-
gressional personnel will recognize which of their former colleagues
are lobbying and which are merely making social calls. Finally, the
House and Senate should amend their respective rules to eliminate for-
mer Members' access to restricted areas such as the Congressional
gymnasium and dining room-areas that are already unavailable to
other lobbyists." 3 By eliminating the special treatment afforded for-
mer Members, Congress reduces further the appearance of
impropriety.
Enforcement is the area that carries the greatest potential for
improvement. If Congress enforced its existing rules more aggres-
sively, there might not be a need to enact a post-employment statute
at all. Congress has too often prematurely called off congressional
110. An example of compensation should include receiving a client's promise to hire a
lobbyist for future jobs if the lobbyist agrees to lobby pro bono for one year after leaving
employment with the legislature. The promise of future employment is a thing of value.
111. For example, an ex-Member who opposes American arms sales to Jordan for personal
reasons may also work for a pro-Israel lobby organization that lobbies to maintain strong
American military and economic aid for Israel. At what point can it be said that former
Members lobby as agents of their employers versus lobbying on their own behalf?.
112. Acts of initially innocent volunteer lobbying might retroactively be made illegal by a
single subsequent instance of compensated lobbying during the one-year period. For example,
suppose a former staffer performs pro bono lobbying for a politically active entity during the first
ten months after resigning a congressional position. However, during the eleventh month after
resignation, the staffer charges an expensive dinner with a current Member on the organization's
charge card. Although this last act may be compensated lobbying under PERA's definition of
"compensation," the proposed legislation does not indicate whether the illegal act has the effect
of tainting all of the previous lobbying activity. If the last act infects all previous acts, the former
staffer might be liable for committing several offenses.
113. See THE WASHINGTON LOBBY, supra note 2, at 96.
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investigations into the ethics of one of its Members or ex-Members. 4
Incomplete probes into allegations of misconduct generate public dis-
trust regarding Congress' ability to control the ethical conduct of its
own members and employees. By actively enforcing its existing rules,
Congress will send a strong message to present and former personnel
that it will not tolerate lobbying misconduct and, if Congress discovers
actual misconduct, it will punish such misconduct severely.
III. CONCLUSION
As Congress examines PERA and its one-year ban on lobbying,
Congress must recognize that lobbying benefits individual citizens and
the legislative process. Lobbying can disclose instances of need, waste,
corruption, and misconduct to an institution that is frequently too
busy to detect such concerns without prompting.'15 Lobbying also
maintains the free flow of ideas between the public and its elected offi-
cials.1 16 Former congressional personnel-turned-lobbyists can play a
vital role in the exchange of ideas between the public and Congress.
PERA recognizes the importance of lobbying and the role of former
congressional personnel by taking a measured approach to post-
employment restrictions. PERA's one-year ban strikes an appropriate
balance between the need to assure public confidence and the desire to
promote full access to Congress.
PERA is the appropriate means by which Congress can cure the
appearance of impropriety. Before enacting PERA, however, Con-
gress should fine-tune the legislation. By placing responsibility on cur-
rent congressional personnel to refrain from improper contact with
former personnel, PERA will more effectively achieve its goals. Con-
gress should also clarify the definition of compensation by placing spe-
cific examples of compensated lobbying in the bill's legislative record.
In addition, Congress should supplement PERA with revised congres-
sional codes of ethics that restrain post-employment misconduct with
effective enforcement provisions. These efforts will improve public
perception of Congress and safeguard against future misconduct.
Joseph . Hochman
114. See supra note 77 (citing this data); see Cohen, Ethics Codes and Political Timing, NAT'L
J., Feb. 24, 1990, at 469.
115. See Smith, supra note 21, at 1178.
116. See generally Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Deleware Serv. Station, 499 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.
Del. 1980).
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